We give the first proof of security for an identity-based encryption scheme in the quantum random oracle model. This is the first proof of security for any scheme in this model that requires no additional assumptions. Our techniques are quite general and we use them to obtain security proofs for two random oracle hierarchical identity-based encryption schemes and a random oracle signature scheme, all of which have previously resisted quantum security proofs, even using additional assumptions. We also explain how to remove the extra assumptions from prior quantum random oracle model proofs. We accomplish these results by developing new tools for arguing that quantum algorithms cannot distinguish between two oracle distributions. Using a particular class of oracle distributions, so called semi-constant distributions, we argue that the aforementioned cryptosystems are secure against quantum adversaries.
Introduction
While quantum computation is not yet viable, Shor [Sho97] showed that when fully realized, quantum computers will break most of the cryptosystems used today, namely those based on the difficulty factoring and the discrete log problem. This has sparked the field of post-quantum cryptography, the search for classical systems secure against quantum adversaries. To be secure in this setting, a system must have an underlying difficult problem for quantum computers, as well as a security reduction showing how to solve this problem using a quantum adversary that breaks the system. Problems based on lattices have so far resisted quantum attacks, and there is a considerable amount of literature on lattice-based cryptosystems. However, random oracle security proofs for these constructions typically only consider classical adversaries, thus failing to show security in the quantum world.
The random oracle model [BR93] is one area where many classical proofs lack quantum equivalents. This model is of interest because random oracle schemes tend to be more efficient than their standard model counterparts. Consequently, the most efficient lattice-based schemes are often constructed in the random oracle model. For example, Gentry, Peikert, and Vaikuntanathan [GPV08] show how to construct signatures and identity-based encryption (IBE). Cash et al. [CHKP10] and Agrawal, Boneh, and Boyen [ABB10] give hierarchical IBE schemes both in the standard model and the random oracle model, with the random oracle constructions being more efficient than the corresponding standard model schemes. Gordon, Katz, and Vaikuntanathan [GKV10] give a group signature scheme, while Boneh and Freeman [BF11] demonstrate a homomorphic signature scheme, all in the random oracle model.
All of these papers prove security against adversaries with classical access to the random oracle. However, when the scheme is instantiated, the random oracle is replaced with a hash function H, which a quantum adversary may evaluate on a quantum superposition of inputs. To model this ability, it is necessary to allow a quantum adversary to make quantum queries to the random oracle. We call this model the quantum random oracle model.
Proving security in the quantum random oracle model presents many challenges. Among them is the difficulty of efficiently simulating the random oracle. In the classical case, the random oracle is simulated on the fly, only generating randomness as needed. In the quantum setting, the adversary can query the oracle on an exponential superposition of inputs. Therefore, to make even the first query look random to the adversary, it would seem that we would need exponential randomness.
In addition to this difficulty, there are classical random oracle techniques that do not make sense if the adversary has quantum access to the random oracle. One such technique is that of Bellare and Rogaway [BR93] for proving the security of the Full Domain Hash signature scheme. In this technique, the reduction algorithm is given a challenge c to solve, and randomly guesses which oracle query the adversary will use to break the scheme. The algorithm embeds c into the response for this query, and if both the guess is correct and the adversary breaks the scheme, then the algorithm will be able to solve c.
In the quantum setting, this argument no longer applies because each oracle query might be over a superposition of exponentially many inputs. We could choose a random query and plug c into all outputs for that query, but this will not look like a random oracle to the adversary. Alternatively, we could choose one oracle input and plug c into the corresponding output for all queries. However, our chance of guessing correctly will then be exponentially small.
Our Contributions
We resolve some of the issues outlined above by giving a quantum analog of the technique of Bellare and Rogaway [BR93] and demonstrating how to simulate a random oracle without any additional computational assumptions. Specifically, we:
• Describe new ways to argue that quantum algorithms cannot distinguish between two distributions of oracles.
• Apply these techniques to a new type of distribution of oracles, which we call semi-constant distributions, showing that they cannot be distinguished from random oracles.
• Use our results on semi-constant distributions to prove that the random oracle IBE scheme of Gentry et al. [GPV08] is secure against quantum adversaries. The basic idea is to plug the challenge c into a small fraction of inputs to the oracle, making the oracle seen by the adversary a semi-constant distribution. The adversary thus behaves as though the oracle is random. If the adversary happens to use any of the inputs in this fraction, we are able to solve c.
• Show that this technique is general by applying it to the random oracle hierarchical IBE schemes of Cash et al. [CHKP10] and Agrawal et al. [ABB10] .
• Prove that the generic Full Domain Hash signature scheme [BR93] is secure against quantum adversaries, though this remains a theoretical result until a trapdoor permutation is found that is secure against quantum adversaries.
• Use our techniques and k-wise independent functions to solve the problem of simulating quantum random oracles, thus making the above results unconditional. give a random oracle scheme that is secure against quantum adversaries with classical access to the oracle, but is insecure once the adversary has quantum access to the oracle. Despite this result, they show that there are circumstances in which a classical random oracle security reduction can also be used in the quantum setting. However, their proof techniques do not apply to the schemes analyzed in this paper. Additionally, their proof simulates the random oracle using a pseudorandom function (PRF) that is secure against quantum adversaries, hence making their results conditional on the existence of a so-called quantum-secure PRF. We note that Zhandry [Zha12] shows that such PRFs can be built from quantum-secure pseudorandom generators, which can, in turn, be built from lattices.
Related Work
There has also been progress toward converting classical security proofs into quantum proofs outside of the random oracle model. For instance, Unruh [Unr10] shows that classical statistical security in Canetti's universal composabitily (UC) model implies quantum statistical security. Hallgren, Smith, and Song [HSS11] give a two-party protocol that is quantum computationally secure in the UC.
Preliminaries
A function (n) is negligible if it is non-negative and smaller than any inverse polynomial. That is, for any polynomial p(n), (n) < 1/p(n) for all sufficiently large n.
A probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm is a classical randomized algorithm that runs in time polynomial in the size of its input. We also call such algorithms efficient.
Weight Assignments
A weight assignment on a set X is a function D : X → R such that x∈X D(x) = 1. We sometimes write Pr D [event] to represent the sum of the weights of all outcomes consistent with that event. A distribution on X is a weight-assignment D such that D(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X . If D is a distribution, way that x occurs with probability D(x). Let U X denote the uniform distribution over X . That is, U X (x) = 1/|X |. When the set X is clear, we may omit the subscript.
We define the distance between two weight assignments D 1 and D 2 over a set X as
Given a set of weight assignments D y over X , indexed by y ∈ Y, and a weight assignment D over Y, we can define a weight assignment D over X where 
Quantum Computation
A quantum algorithm is an algorithm executed on a quantum computer that produces a classical output. Most of the background in quantum computation needed to understand this paper is for the proof of Theorem 3.1. Since this proof appears in Appendix B, we present the necessary background there. In the meantime, we recall a couple basic facts about quantum computation, and refer the reader to [NC00] for a more thorough discussion. Fact 2. Any function that has an efficient classical algorithm computing it can be implemented efficiently as a quantum-accessible oracle.
Fact 3. Given a quantum algorithm A with oracle access to an oracle O, each oracle O defines a probability distribution of the outputs of A. Hence, any weight assignment of oracles leads to a weight assignment of outputs of A, and if two weight assignments D 1 and D 2 are a distance apart, the weight assignment of the outputs of A under these distributions are a distance at most apart.
Cryptographic Primitives
Here we briefly outline a few cryptographic primitives, and refer to Appendix A for details. All primitives depend on a security parameter n.
An encryption scheme E is a triple of PPT algorithms (E.Gen, E.Enc, E.Dec), where E.Gen(1 n ) generates secret/public keys (sk, pk), E.Enc pk encrypts a message, and E.Dec sk decrypts a ciphertext. We use the indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA) notion of security [GM84] .
An identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme IBE = (IBE.Gen, IBE.Extract, IBE.Enc, IBE.Dec) is a 4-tuple of PPT algorithms where IBE.Gen(1 n ) generates master secret/public keys (msk, mpk), IBE.Extract msk generates secret keys for given identities, IBE.Enc mpk encrypts a message to an identity, and IBE.Dec decrypts a ciphertext sent to an identity by using the corresponding secret key. We use the indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack (IND-ID-CPA) notion of security [BF01] .
A signature scheme S = (S.Gen, S.Sign, S.Ver) is a triple of PPT algorithms where S.Gen(1 n ) generates secret/public keys (sk, pk), S.Sign sk signs a message, and S.Ver pk verifies a signature. We use the existential unforgeablility under chosen message attack (UF-CMA) notion of security [GMR88] .
A pre-image sampleable function (PSF) is a quadruple of algorithms F = (F.Gen, F.Sample, f, f −1 ) where F.Gen generates private/public keys (sk, pk), f pk is a function, F.Sample samples x from a distribution D such that f pk (x) is uniform, and f
For security, we use the notion of one-wayness.
A trapdoor permutation (TDP) is a special case of a PSF where f is bijective and F.Sample simply returns a random element in the domain of f pk . Since F.Sample is already defined, we omit it from the specification.
Random Oracle Model
In the Random Oracle Model, we assume the existence of a random function H, and give all parties oracle access to this function. If A makes queries to an oracle H, we denote this as A H . If a system S uses a random oracle in its specification, we denote this as S H . The algorithms comprising any cryptographic protocol can use H, as can the adversary. Thus we modify the security games for all cryptographic systems to allow the adversary to make random oracle queries.
When a random oracle scheme is implemented, some suitable hash function H is included in the specification. Any algorithm (adversary included) now replaces oracle queries with evaluations of this hash function. In the quantum setting, because a quantum algorithm can evaluate H on an arbitrary superposition, we must allow the quantum adversary to make quantum queries to the random oracle. We call this the quantum random oracle model.
Distinguishing Oracles With Quantum Queries
In this section, we give some tools for arguing that quantum algorithms cannot distinguish between two distributions of oracles. The trivial way to bound the ability of any quantum algorithm to distinguish two oracle distributions D 1 and D 2 is to bound the distance between D 1 and D 2 themselves. However, in many cases, the distributions we are interested in are in fact very far apart, so we need some new techniques for arguing indistinguishability. First, we show that kwise equivalent distributions are indistinguishable, using techniques similar to that of Meyer This is proved in Appendix B, and immediately implies two important facts:
• If two weight assignments on oracles, D 1 and D 2 , are 2q-wise equivalent, then anyuery quantum algorithm behaves the same under both weight assignments, since for all 2q pairs
• If the quantities Pr
for any set S is also a low-degree polynomial.
We use the second fact to prove the following theorem: 
• p is a polynomial in λ of degree at most d.
• p (i) (0), the ith derivative of p at 0, is 0 for each i ∈ {1, ..., ∆ − 1}.
Then any quantum algorithm A makinguantum queries can only distinguish D λ from D 0 with probability at most 
Let Z λ be the set of z such that z is a more likely output under
Fix λ 0 , and consider the quantity 
We conclude this section with another general approach toward arguing that no quantum algorithm can distinguish between two oracle distributions D 1 and D 2 : construct a weight assignment D 1,2 which is 2q-wise equivalent to D 1 (so that the behaviors of A under D 1 and D 1,2 are the same) and that is a distance at most from D 2 (so that the behaviors of A under D 1,2 and D 2 are -close). Then the behaviors of A under D 1 and D 2 are also -close. We formalize this latter idea with a new pseudometric on oracle distributions: Proof. If D is k-wise equivalent to D 1 and a distance from D 2 , we say that D is a witness to
First, we argue that an optimal witness exists: We see that D 1 itself is a witness to
) over the set of assignments D 1,2 that are k-wise similar to D 1 (a closed set) and at most |D 1 − D 2 | away from D 2 (a compact set). Thus we are minimizing over a compact set, so the minimum is actually obtained.
We now show that |D 1 − D 2 | (k) satisfies the properties of a pseudometric:
is non-negative for all weight assignments D 1 and D 2 .
•
The sums of all weights add to 1, so this is a weight assignment. Further, it is easy to see that
, when looking at the marginal weight assignment over any k inputs, D 1 and D 1,2 cancel, leaving D 2,1 to be k-wise equivalent to D 2 . Thus, D 2,1 is a witness to
We can perform the same argument in reverse to get the other inequality.
and D 2,3 be the optimal witnesses for
. It is easy to see that D 3 is a weight assignment and that We note that a slightly weaker version of Theorem 3.2 can also be proved using the above ideas. Roughly, we pick some constants λ i and find functions a i (λ) such that
The a i (λ) are basically modified Lagrange interpolating polynomials. Next, we define a new weight assignment
By defining D λ in this way, D λ turns out to be 2q-wise equivalent to D λ . Because D λ i are all distributions, the distance between D λ and D 0 is at most 2
also satisfies this bound. By picking the right values for λ i , we can get this bound to be small. We can then use Corollary 3.5 to bound the distance between the output distributions of the q-query quantum algorithm A.
Semi-Constant Distributions
In this section, we define a class of distributions on oracles in H X ,Y called semi-constant distributions. Our motivation for these distributions is to support quantum Full Domain Hash-type arguments, where a random value is inserted into a small but significant fraction of oracle inputs. The following definition captures the essence of the this idea: Definition 4.1. Define SC λ , the semi-constant distribution, as the distribution over H X ,Y resulting from the following process:
• First, pick a random element y from Y.
• For each x ∈ X , do one of the following:
First, notice that SC 0 is the uniform distribution, since in this case, the probability that an input is distinguished is 0. We bound the ability of a quantum algorithm to distinguish between SC λ and SC 0 = U using the ideas of Section 3. We note that using standard quantum query results, it is possible to prove this corollary for a bound that is first-order in λ. However, we will see in Section 5 that we need a bound that is second-order in λ for our security results.
We do not know if this bound is tight. In Appendix C, we adapt the collision search algorithm of Brassard et al. [BHT97] to SC λ , obtaining a distinguishing probability of Ω(q 3 H λ 2 ).
Quantum Security Arguments
In this section, we explore the random oracle proof technique of Bellare and Rogaway [BR93] . In this technique, we plug a challenge c into a randomly chosen hash query, and hope that the adversary uses c to break the system. If so, we can use the adversary to solve the underlying problem.
In the quantum setting, the straight-forward application of this technique breaks down. The adversary can now query the hash function on a superposition of exponentially many inputs. If we plug c to one of those inputs, the probability that the adversary uses c is exponentially small.
We instead plug c into some small but significant fraction of the inputs, so that the oracle is distributed according to SC λ . As we have shown, a quantum algorithm cannot detect that this oracle is not random, but now the adversary uses c with significant probability.
Identity-Based Encryption from Lattices
Here we prove the security of the IBE scheme from Gentry et al. [GPV08] . Their scheme is constructed from an encryption scheme E = (E.Gen, E.Enc, E.Dec), for which there exists a trapdoor allowing the computation of secret keys from public keys.
More specifically, let F = (F.Gen, F.Sample, f, f −1 ) be a pre-image sampleable function (PSF). Suppose E.Gen(1 n ) works as follows: generate (msk, mpk) ← F.Gen(1 n ). Then, sample sk ← F.Sample(1 n ), and compute pk = f mpk (sk). Output (sk, (pk, mpk)).
Gentry et al. give such an encryption scheme based on the hardness of lattice problems. Their security reduction treats the adversary as a black box, so their proof holds in the quantum setting. They then prove the security of the IBE scheme IBE = (IBE.Gen = F.Gen, IBE.Extract H , IBE.Enc H , IBE.Dec) where H maps identities to public keys of E and: 
Let λ ∈ (0, 1) to be chosen later. Let M be the identity space. Define Game 1 as follows: first, pick a subset X of M where each id ∈ M is put in X with independent probability λ. Run A as before to obtain (c, id * , Q). However, now we decide if the game is won as follows: if id * ∈ X and Q X = ∅, then the game is won if c = 0. Otherwise, flip a random coin to decide if the game is won. By our assumption that A never asks for a secret key for the challenge identity, we must have that id * / ∈ Q. Therefore, every identity in Q, as well as id * , has an independent probability λ of being in X . Thus, the conditions to not flip a coin are met with probability at least λ(1 − λq E ), independent of the probability that c = 0. Thus, Game 1 is won with probability at least
Let Game 2 be Game 1 , except that we choose a random pk in the public key space of E, and set H(x) = pk for all x in X , and choose H(x) randomly for all other x. H is now distributed according to SC λ .
Claim 1. There exists a polynomial (·, ·) such that A wins Game 2 with probability at least
We defer the precise proof to Appendix D, and instead give an informal justification: by Corollary 4.3, the output distribution of A in Game 2 is at most a distance 8 3 (q H +q E +1) 4 λ 2 from that of Game 1 . Thus, we would expect A to win Game 2 with probability at least
which has the desired form. Of course, deciding if A wins Game 2 depends on the set of distinguished inputs X , so a more careful analysis is required to justify the claim.
Let us now restate Game 2 in terms of A: pick X and H as above, and perform the standard attack game for IBE using H as the random oracle. When A produces b , first check that no extraction queries were in X and that the identity id * produced by A is in X . If so, A wins if and only if b = b . Otherwise, if the check fails, flip a coin to decide if A wins. We can now make the following observation: once an extraction query in X is made or the challenge query with id * / ∈ X is made, we can abort running A, since we no longer need A to determine if the game is won. Now we describe an adversary B that breaks E. Assume B has quantum access to two random oracles O 1 and O 2 . O 1 maps identities to randomness used by Sample. O 2 maps identities to bits, outputting 1 with probability is λ. In Section 6, we will show how to efficiently simulate these oracles. On input (mpk, pk), B works as follows:
• Send mpk to A and simulate A, playing the role of challenger to A.
• Construct a (quantum) oracle H such that
where Sample(; r) means run Sample with randomness r.
• When A asks for the secret key for id i , compute O 2 (id i ). If the result is 1, output a random bit and abort. Otherwise, respond with sk i = Sample(; O 1 (id i )).
• When A produces the challenge query (id * , m 0 , m 1 ), check if O 2 (id * ) = 1. If so, send (m 0 , m 1 ) to B's challenger. Otherwise, output a random bit and abort.
• When the challenger responds with a ciphertext, send it to A.
• When A outputs a bit b , output the same bit.
Let X be the set of identities id such that O 2 (id) = 1. We can then see that the abort conditions are equivalent to Game 2 . For each extract query id i that succeeds, we have that O 2 (id i ) = 0, so
Thus sk i is a correct secret key for id i , and it is distributed correctly (since it is a random pre-image of H(id i )). If B does not abort on the challenge query, it means O 2 (id * ) = 1, so H(id * ) = pk. Also, we can see that H is distributed according to SC λ . Therefore, if B aborts, we win with probability 1 2 , and if we do not abort, we win if and only if A wins. Thus, the view of A as a subroutine of B is the same as in Game 2 , and B wins with the same probability that A does. Therefore, B wins with probability at least
λ 2 . The advantage of B is at least λ − (q H , q E )λ 2 /4. We can now choose λ: the maximum advantage occurs when λ = 2 / (q H , q E ), which gives
Thus, if A had non-negligible advantage, so does B.
Hierarchical IBE from Lattices
In this section, we show the general idea behind adapting the techniques above to proving the security of the hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) schemes of Agrawal et al. [ABB10] and Cash et al. [CHKP10] .
In a HIBE scheme, identities are structured as a tree, with the identity of any node containing the identity of its parent as a proper prefix. Any node on the tree can produce private keys for any nodes in the subtree rooted at that node. We allow an adversary to adaptively take control of an arbitrary number of nodes in the tree (and thus the subtrees rooted there). An HIBE scheme is secure if the adversary cannot decrypt messages encrypted to an identity id * of the adversaries choice but not under its control.
In [ABB10] , the random oracle scheme has an oracle H that maps identities to some random quantities. The reduction has the following high-level structure:
• Guess which level w of the tree contains the identity id *
• For each level i, generate some random quantities R i .
• For each level i, simulate a separate random oracle for identities at that level. For i, guess which query number q i will contain the hash of the level-i parent of id * .
• Answer the jth random oracle query at level i on id i,j as follows: if j = q i , output R i . Otherwise, output a random value.
• Answer secret key queries on id in some special way, but fail if for all prefixes id i of id,
• When the adversary generates the identity id * , we succeed if both the adversary succeeds and if id * is at level w and all prefixes id * i of id
We now show how to prove security by repeatedly applying the arguments of Theorem 5.1. Basically, we iterate over levels i, and insert R i into a λ i fraction of identities at that level. In iteration i, we say the adversary wins if it won in the previous iteration, the level-i prefix of the chosen identity id * is in the λ i fraction of distinguished identities (that is, H(id * i ) = R i ), and no signature query is. Let = (q H , q E ), where (·, ·) is the polynomial from Theorem 5.1. If the iteration i advantage is i , then using the same techniques as in Theorem 5.1, we can set λ i so that
We will say that in iteration 0, the adversary wins if it normally would win and we guessed which level id * belonged to correctly. That is, 0 = /d, where is the adversary's advantage in the standard game. This gives us a total advantage after iteration d of at least
Notice that the dependence on d in doubly-exponential, whereas in the classical proof it was singly exponential. Thus, for the same security parameters, this proof only works for much smaller depth than the classical proof.
These techniques apply as well to the random oracle HIBE of Cash et al. [CHKP10] , though their reduction is a bit more complicated, as there is a second random oracle G which needs to be handled in a similar way.
Signatures from Trapdoor Permutations
Here we discuss the security of the Full Domain Hash (FDH) signature scheme: Definition 5.2 (FDH Signatures). Let F = (F.Gen, f, f −1 ) be a trapdoor permutation, and a hash function H that maps messages to images of f , let S H = (S.Gen = F.Gen, S.Sign H , S.Ver H ) where:
We now state the main theorem of this section:
Theorem 5.3. Let F be a quantum one-way trapdoor permutation. If we model H as a random oracle, then S is quantum UF-CMA-secure
The proof of this theorem is very similar to that of Theorem 5.1, and appears in Appendix E.
Simulating Random Oracles
In this last section, we explain how to efficiently simulate random oracles. All quantum random oracle proofs to date require the reduction algorithm to have quantum access to a random oracle, but a truly random oracle requires exponentially many bits of randomness to construct. We show that this is not a problem: Notice, however, that f i need not be secure against all adversaries, just the adversary we are simulating. We know that our adversary makes q i queries to oracle O i , so it suffices to have f i be PRFs secure for up to q i quantum queries. In the classical setting, q i -wise independent functions (functions that are q i -wise equivalent to a random function) serve as perfectly secure PRFs for up to q i classical queries. We could hope that something similar holds in the quantum world: indeed, according to Theorem 3.1, if f i is 2q i -wise equivalent to a random function, then the behavior of our adversary is the same when the oracle is random and when it is f i . Thus if the f i are 2q i -wise independent, algorithm A, as a subroutine of B, behaves identically to the case where A is given truly random oracles. Hence, the output distribution of B is identical to that of A.
Efficient constructions of k-wise independent functions have been known for some time [Jof74, KM94] , and they have been used extensively in the derandomization literature [Lub85, ABI86, KM93] . One common approach to construct a k-wise independent function f from X to Y is to assume that N = |Y| is a prime power and interpret Y as the field F N . Then define a matrix C with the following properties:
• The entries are elements in F N .
• There are |X | rows and some small number r of columns.
• Each subset of k rows is linearly independent.
One such example is the Vandermonde matrix, which is used by Alon et al. [ABI86] . To define the function f , we then pick a random vector v in F r N . f (x) is then the xth element of of the vector Cv. Since any k rows of C are linearly independent, any k elements of Cv are independent, and hence f is k-wise independent. The key to making this efficient is that to compute f (x), we only need the xth row of C, which we can compute on the fly.
Hence, we can simulate O 1 from Theorem 5.1. To simulate O 2 , which outputs a bit such that O 2 (x) = 1 with probability λ, approximate λ by some rational number a/b where b is a prime power, and construct a k-wise independent function f with range Y = {1, ..., b}. Then set
Conclusion
We have shown how to adapt certain classical random oracle arguments to the quantum random oracle model. Specifically, we gave quantum security proofs for the IBE scheme of Gentry et al. [GPV08] and the Full Domain Hash signature scheme. We achieved this by defining a distribution of oracles, called semi-constant distributions, and showing that such oracles cannot be distinguished from a random oracle by a quantum adversary. We also show how these techniques can be applied to the random oracle HIBE schemes of Cash et al. [CHKP10] and Agrawal et al. [ABB10] . Lastly, we have shown how to remove the need for quantum-secure pseudorandom functions from prior work. Although we have made progress toward converting classical random oracle proofs into quantum proofs, there is still much work to be done. First, reductions using our technique result in an algorithm whose advantage is the square of the advantage of the underlying adversary, divided by some other factors. While improving the reduction to first-order in the adversary's advantage would still be of interest for the IBE scheme and Full Domain Hash, it would not affect the qualitative security statements. However, for the HIBE schemes, this second-order behavior results in an exponential weakening of the security relative to the classical reduction for deep identity trees. Therefore, to get the same qualitative security statements as in the classical world, our technique needs to be refined to make the reduction first-order in .
Further work lies in proving the security of other Random Oracle Model schemes. For example, the construction of signatures from identification protocols by Fiat and Shamir [FS87] , though similar to the proofs in this paper, still needs a quantum proof. The difficulty in the Fiat-Shamir reduction is that the plugging step initiates the underlying identification protocol, and there is no obvious quantum analog for this strategy. Also, different types of security arguments, such as Fujisaki and Okamoto's generic conversion of weakly secure encryption schemes into a CCA-secure encryption scheme [FO99] , still lack a quantum proof of security.
A Cryptographic Primitives
Definition A.1 (Encryption Scheme). A public key encryption scheme E is a triple of PPT algorithms (E.Gen, E.Enc, E.Dec) where
• E.Gen(1 n ) generates a secret/public key pair (sk, pk).
• E.Enc pk (m) computes a ciphertext c.
• E.Dec sk (c) computes the plaintext m, such that E.Dec sk (E.Enc pk (m)) = m.
We use the standard chosen plaintest attack (CPA) game [GM84] to model security:
• The challenger generates (sk, pk) ← E.Gen(1 n ), and sends pk to the adversary A.
• A generates the challenge plaintext (m 0 , m 1 ).
• The challenger chooses a bit b, and responds with the challenge ciphertext c = E.Enc pk (m b ).
• A makes a guess b for b.
The advantage of A is , where 1 2 + is the probability that b = b . We say that E is (quantum) IND-CPA-secure if all efficient (quantum) algorithms have only negligible advantage (in n).
An identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme IBE is an encryption scheme where identities serve as public keys, and a trusted authority hands out the corresponding secret keys. In particular:
Definition A.2 (IBE Scheme). An identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme IBE is a quadruple of PPT algorithms (IBE.Gen, IBE.Extract, IBE.Enc, IBE.Dec) where
• IBE.Gen(1 n ) generates a master secret/public key pair (msk, mpk).
• The trusted authority uses IBE.Extract msk (id) to compute a secret key sk id corresponding to the identity id.
• IBE.Enc mpk (id, m) encrypts m to identity id.
• IBE.Dec sk id (c) decrypts c, such that
We use the standard CPA attack game for IBE schemes, where the adversary can choose the identity id for which it will attempt to decrypt, and can get the secret keys corresponding to any other identities [BF01] . Specifically,
• The challenger generates (msk, mpk) ← IBE.Gen(1 n ), and sends mpk to the adversary A.
• The adversary can make extraction queries on identities id i , to which the challenger responds with IBE.Extract msk (id i ).
• The adversary generates an identity id, and two messages (m 0 , m 1 ).
• The challenger chooses a random bit b, and responds with IBE.Enc id (m b ).
The advantage of A is , where • S.Gen(1 n ) generates a secret/public key pair (sk, pk).
• S.Sign sk (m) computes a signature σ on the message m.
• S.Ver pk (m, σ) outputs accept or reject, such that S.Ver pk (m, S.Sign sk (m)) = accept.
We will use the standard chosen message attack (CMA) game to define security [GMR88] :
• The challenger generates (sk, pk) ← S.Gen(1 n ), and sends pk to the adversary A.
• A can make signature queries on messages m i , to which the challenger responds with S.Sign sk (m i ).
• A produces a forgery candidate (m, σ).
The advantage of A is the probability that m = m i for any i and Ver pk (m, σ) = accept. We say that S is (quantum) UF-CMA-secure if all efficient (quantum) adversaries have negligible advantage (in n).
Definition A.4 (PSF). A pre-image sampleable function (PSF) is a quadruple of algorithms
• F.Gen(1 n ) generates a secret/public key pair (sk, pk).
• f pk is a function.
• F.Sample samples x from a distribution D such that f pk (x) is uniform.
• f
We model security with the following game:
• The challenger generates (sk, pk) ← F.Gen(1 n ), and sends pk to the adversary A. It also sends y = f pk (F.Sample()) to A.
• A makes a guess x.
The advantage of A is the probability that f pk (x) = y. We say that F is (quantum) one-way if all efficient (quantum) algorithms have negligible advantage.
B Quantum Computation
We give some background on quantum computation. For a more thorough discussion, please see [NC00] . We also prove Theorem 3.1, which states that the output distribution of a quantum algorithm making q H queries to a quantum oracle drawn from some distribution D depends only on the marginal distributions of D on all subsets of 2q inputs.
Let H be a Hilbert space with an inner product ·|· , and let B = {|x } be an orthonormal basis for H, index by a parameter x ∈ X . The state of a quantum system on H is specified by a vector |φ ∈ H of norm 1.
Quantum Measurement
Given a state |φ , we can measure |φ in the basis B, obtaining the value x ∈ X with probability | x|φ | 2 . Thus, to each |φ , we associate a distribution D φ where
The normalization constant and the fact that B is an orthonormal basis ensure that this is in fact a valid distribution. After measurement, the system is in state |x . If B = {|x, y } for x ∈ X and y ∈ Y, then we can also perform a partial measurement over X . The distribution over X is the marginal distribution of D φ when restricted to X . That is, we obtain the value x with probability y∈Y | x, y|φ | 2 . The resulting state is the result of projecting |φ to the space spanned by {|x, y } for y ∈ Y, and renormalizing so that the norm is 1.
Quantum Algorithms A quantum algorithm A over a Hilbert space H with an orthonormal basis B is specified by unitary transformation U . The input to A is an element x 0 ∈ X. The system is initialized to the basis state |x 0 , and U is applied to the system, obtaining the final state |φ = U |x 0 . Then the state is sampled according to the distribution D φ . Let X and Y be sets such that Y is a commutative group with addition operation ⊕. For notational convenience, we assume that every element has order at most 2 (y ⊕ y is the identity for all y ∈ Y). Given a function H : X → Y and third set Z, define the orthonormal basis B as the set {|x, y, z } for x ∈ X , y ∈ Y, and z ∈ Z. Define the unitary transformation H trans over the Hilbert space spanned by B as the transformation that takes |x, y, z into |x, y ⊕ H(x), z . H trans is unitary, it's own inverse, and Hermitian. As an abuse of notation, we will frequently use H trans and H interchangeably.
A quantum algorithm A makinguantum queries to H is then specified by a sequence of unitary transformations U 0 , ..., U q . We say that a quantum algorithm is efficient if q is a polynomial, and all the U i are composed of a polynomial number of universal basis gates (the Hadamard, CNOT, and phase shift gates are commonly used).
Classical queries to an oracle are made by partial sampling over X before performing the query.
Density Matrix Suppose we have quantum states |φ w for w ∈ W, and we have a weight assignment D on W. Then we define the density matrix
The weight of an outcome y from measurement is given by y|ρ|y . If D is a distribution, then this weight assignment is also a distribution, and the weight corresponds to the probability of obtaining y if we first pick w with probability D(w), and then sample |φ w . In this case, the density matrix ρ summarizes the statistical behavior of the quantum system. Suppose we have two weight assignments D 1 and D 2 on W. Let D 1 and D 2 be the corresponding weight assignments of outcomes of measurement. Since the weight assignment induced by each |φ w is in fact a distribution,
For this paper, we will focus on the case where W is the set of oracles H from X → Y, and |φ H is the final state of some quantum algorithm A that makesueries to the oracle H.
B.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
Proof of Theorem 3.1.
Let A be some quantum oracle algorithm. Suppose right before the first query, the state of the system is |φ 0 = xyz α xyz |xyz (which is independent of the oracle). Assume for notational convenience that all the transition matrices U i are identical and equal to U (the proof in the general case is essentially identical). Let |φ q,H be the state of A afterueries to oracle H. That is,
Let ρ q be the density matrix for A afterueries when the oracle H is drawn from a distribution D:
We can now evaluate ρ q component-wise:
Now we can rearrange the order of summation as 
Thus, the density matrix ρ q , which contains all the statistical information about the algorithm A, is a linear combination of the quantities Pr
In particular, the probability of any particular output is on the diagonal of ρ q , and is thus a linear combination. Since the probabilities are real, we can take the coefficients of Pr D [H(x i ) = r i , H(x i ) = r i ∀i ∈ {1, ..., q}] to be real as well.
C More on Semi-Constant Distributions
In this section, we prove Lemma 4.2, which states that the marginal distributions for any k inputs of oracles drawn from SC λ specified by polynomials of degree k for which the λ 1 coefficient is 0. We also describe a quantum algorithm for finding collisions in SC λ using O(λ −2/3 ) oracle queries.
C.1 Proof of Lemma 4.2
Proof of Lemma 4.2. Recall that SC λ is defined as follows:
• Pick y at random from Y.
• For each x ∈ X , with probability 1 − λ, set H(x) to be a random element of Y. With probability λ, set H(x) = y.
Suppose Y contains N elements. Let α((x j ), (r j )) = Pr[H(x i ) = r j ∀i ∈ {1, ..., k}], the probability that x j maps to r j for k values of x j and r j . Suppose there are distinct r j , denoted t m , and let k m be the number of r j equal to t m (note that m=1 k m = k). Let F be the set {1, ..., , ⊥}. For each f ∈ F, if f =⊥, f is associated with the event that t m = y for all m, and otherwise, f is associated with the event that t f = y.
Let eq f,m be 1 if f = m, 0 otherwise. The probability that O(x j ) = t m is 1/N if we are choosing the output at random, and otherwise, it is 1 if t m = y and 0 otherwise. In other words, this probability is This is a polynomial in λ. It is a sum of products of k m = k monomials in λ, so its total degree is at most k. Now, we shall approximate this to first order in λ, and show that the first-order coefficient is 0: Notice that f Pr[f ]eq f,m is the probability that t m = y, which is equal to 1/N . Thus, all the terms in the first-order coefficient cancel out, so the λ 1 coefficient is 0. This completes the lemma.
C.2 Finding Collisions in Semi-Constant Distributions
Here we explore the problem of finding a collision in an oracle drawn from a semi-constant distribution SC λ over H X ,Y . Our motivation for studying the collision problem is as follows: a classical algorithm making q H queries can only distinguish SC λ from random with probability O(λ 2 q 2 H ), since it can only distinguish the two cases if it happens to query two distinguished points. Further, querying random points, and outputting 1 if a collision is found achieves this bound. Thus, a collision search is the best way to distinguish SC λ from random in the classical setting, and the same may also be true in the quantum setting Let N = |Y| be the number of elements in Y, and assume that λ >> 1 N so that finding a collision requires (with high probability) finding a collision in the distinguished inputs.
Let c be the minimum constant such that SC λ is indistinguishable from uniform with except with probability O(q c λ 2 ). Corollary 4.3 shows us that c ≤ 4. We will now show that c ≥ 3, using Plugging this into our expression for γ c , we get that γ c is a polynomial of degree at most 2q + q S + 1, and that it is equal to Otherwise, return σ i = O 1 (m i ).
• When A returns a forgery candidate (m, σ), test if O 2 (m) = 1 and f pk (σ) = y. If so, output σ. Otherwise, abort.
Using an analysis similar to that of Theorem 5.1, we get that the advantage of B is at least 2 (q H , q S ) when we set λ = 2 / (q H , q S ).
